

Message Text

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USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SALT TWO GENEVA 0347

EXDIS/SALT

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1975
(SALT TWO-778)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF SEPTEMBER 9, 1975, INCLUDING
LANGUAGE FOR ARTICLE IV.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, SEPTEMBER 9, 1975

I

THE FORMULATIONS OF ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 2, WHICH SO
FAR REMAIN UNAGREED, HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED AT DELEGATION
MEETINGS, IN PARTICULAR, ON AUGUST 8 AND 29, AS WELL AS IN
CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN HEADS OF DELEGATION. IT IS ADVISABLE
TO CONTINUE THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS IN ORDER TO FACILITATE
REMOVAL OF EXISTING DIFFERENCES ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
BASIS.

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I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE AREA OF COINCIDING LANGUAGE IN ARTICLE XVIII HAS EXPANDED CONSIDERABLY AS A RESULT OF THE USSR DELEGATION TABLING ON JULY 7, 1975 A PERTINENT NEW SOVIET PROPOSAL WHICH TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD BEFORE THE WORKING RECESS.

WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT WHAT AN IMPORTANT ROLE, IN TERMS OF IMPLEMENTING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT, IS PLAYED BY THE PROVISION ON CONSIDERATION OF QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED AND RELATED SITUATIONS WHICH MAY BE CONSIDERED AMBIGUOUS. VERY SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SCC, CONNECTED WITH THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED, ARE ALSO DEFINED BY THE PROVISIONS ON FURNISHING ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS SUCH INFORMATION AS EITHER SIDE WILL CONSIDER NECESSARY TO ASSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED, AS WELL AS ON CONSIDERING QUESTIONS INVOLVING UNINTENDED INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION. IT IS ALSO INTENDED THAT IN THE SCC THE SIDES WILL AGREE UPON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN CASES PROVIDED FOR BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, WILL CONSIDER POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION WHICH HAVE A BEARING ON THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WILL ALSO CONSIDER, AS APPROPRIATE, POSSIBLE PROPOSALS FOR FURTHER INCREASING THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

TAKEN IN THEIR TOTALITY, THE CITED PROVISIONS, EMBODYING THE WORK EXPERIENCE OF THE SCC IN CONNECTION WITH COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CURRENTLY IN FORCE, ARE DEEPLY AND INHERENTLY IN ACCORD WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND WITH THE OTHER FUNDAMENTAL PROVISIONS ON WHICH THE DOCUMENT BEING WORKED OUT WILL BE BASED, AND THEY ENSURE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC IN THE LIGHT OF THOSE QUESTIONS WHICH THE COMMISSION WILL HAVE TO RESOLVE WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT. CARRYING OUT THESE FUNCTIONS BY THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROVIDING THE SIDES WITH CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS

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BEING ESTABLISHED, AND WOULD LEAD TO INCREASING TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES, WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS.

IN TERMS OF WORKING OUT THE DRAFT AGREEMENT IT IS OF IMPORTANCE THAT THERE ARE NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SIDES WITH REGARD TO THE AFOREMENTIONED PROVISIONS. THEY ARE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE.

OBJECTIONS ARISE WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSALS FOR THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC, ADVANCED IN CONNECTION WITH ARTICLE XVIII, WHICH GO BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED AND CONFLICT WITH ITS BASIC CONTENT.

THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF THE PROPOSAL FOR PERIODIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON NUMBERS BY CATEGORY OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF THE SIDES, WHICH ARE TO BE LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, HAS BEEN SHOWN HERE IN A SUBSTANTIATED MANNER. SUCH A PROVISION WOULD IN SUBSTANCE CAST DOUBT UPON THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, AND WOULD THEREBY BE DAMAGING TO THE SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE WHOLE AGREEMENT. OBJECTIVELY THERE IS NO NEED WHATEVER FOR AN EXCHANGE OF SUCH INFORMATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SCC. THIS WOULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WHERE THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WOULD BE NOT THE ACTUAL COMPLIANCE BY THE SIDES WITH THEIR OBLIGATIONS, BUT THE INFORMATION RECEIVED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SCC. SUCH A SITUATION WOULD BE CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE.

IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND TRUST BETWEEN THE SIDES, THE NEED MAY ARISE IN THE FUTURE TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, WHICH EACH SIDE WILL CONSIDER USEFUL TO PROVIDE TO THE OTHER SIDE IN ORDER TO ENSURE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. IT IS PRECISELY SUCH A NEED THAT IS COVERED BY THE SOVIET WORDING OF ARTICLE XVIII, SUBPAR. 2 (B), WHICH HAS BEEN MENTIONED HERE. DEMONSTRATING THE INTENTION OF THE

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SIDES TO COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED, AND BEING SUBSTANTIVELY AND LOGICALLY LINKED WITH THE PROVISION TO CONSIDER AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS, THIS PROVISION SATISFACTORILY RESOLVES THE QUESTION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE SCC IN THIS RESPECT.

UNJUSTIFIED ALSO IS THE PROPOSAL TO AGREE UPON SOME SORT OF ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE LIMITATIONS OR REMOVAL THEREFROM OF THE ARMS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

IT FOLLOWS QUITE PRECISELY FROM THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI FROM WHAT MOMENT ON THE ARMS BEING LIMITED ARE TO BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LIMIT. THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI, PAR. 3, ALSO DEFINITELY SPECIFY THAT THE ARMS CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS ESTABLISHED UNTIL THEY ARE DISMANTLED OR DESTROYED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCC PROCEDURES. MOREOVER, ON THIS QUESTION THE SIDES ARE OF ONE MIND, AS ALSO CONFIRMED, IN PARTICULAR, IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1975.

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CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS COMPLETELY CLEAR WHEN ARMS OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER, OF THOSE BEING LIMITED UNDER THE AGREEMENT, ARE INCLUDED IN THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED, AND WHEN THEY ARE REMOVED THEREFROM.

AS ALREADY EMPHASIZED, ALL THE DATA REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THE SIDES WITH CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT ARE OBTAINED BY THE SIDES BY THE NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL. THIS CLEARLY ENSUES FROM THE JOINT DOCUMENT'S ARTICLE XVII, PAR. 1, AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES.

AS FOR THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF AUGUST 15, 1975, IN SUBSTANCE PRECISE AGREED SOLUTIONS FOR THEM HAVE ALREADY BEEN FOUND IN THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VI OF THE JOINT DRAFT DOCUMENT.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THIS CONCERNS SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

PERTAINING TO DISMANTLING AND DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES WHICH THE SCC WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO AGREE UPON, THEY MUST BE RESOLVED SPECIFICALLY, DEPENDING ON THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF SUCH QUESTIONS. TIMELY AGREEMENT ON SUCH PROCEDURES FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE NEW AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED WILL BE A TASK AND A FUNCTION OF THE SCC. AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, NO PROBLEMS ARISE IN THIS CONNECTION.

THE U.S. DELEGATION'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 5, 1975 CONTAINS CONSIDERATIONS, THE GIST OF WHICH IS TO PROVIDE THAT SCC PROCEDURES CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE SIDES BE SPECIFICALLY SPELLED OUT ALREADY NOW, AT THE STAGE OF WORKING OUT A DRAFT AGREEMENT. THERE IS NO NEED FOR THAT. THE SPECIFIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT SUCH PROCEDURES WILL BE DISCUSSED IN THE SCC IN CONNECTION WITH THE COVERAGE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE PROCEDURES TO BE WORKED OUT.

I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE FURTHER THAT THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKING OUT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENTS CURRENTLY IN FORCE, INCLUDING DISCUSSION AT THAT TIME OF THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS, HAS
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SHOWN THAT THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR INCLUDING A PROVISION ON ADVANCE NOTIFICATIONS IN THESE AGREEMENTS. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE THREE AND A HALF YEARS DURING WHICH THESE AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN IN FORCE CONFIRMS THE CORRECTNESS OF THE DECISION TAKEN. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT THERE IS NO POINT IN RAISING THIS QUESTION ANEW, A QUESTION THAT WAS EXTENSIVELY DISCUSSED AND RESOLVED BY THE SIDES EARLIER. THIS WOULD ONLY LEAD TO THE APPEARANCE OF UNNECESSARY COMPLICATIONS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THERE IS ALSO NO NEED TO MENTION NOTIFICATIONS ON DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES IN ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 2. SUCH NOTIFICATIONS ARE A COMPONENT OF THE PROCEDURES, AND SINCE THE SCC FUNCTIONS WILL INCLUDE REACHING AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES AND DATES FOR DISMANTLING OR DESTRUCTION, THE SIDES, IN SO DOING, WILL ALSO RESOLVE THE QUESTION OF NOTIFICATIONS, OF COURSE, DEPENDING ON THOSE SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC TYPES OF ARMS, WHICH WILL BE PROVIDED FOR IN SUCH PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW AGREEMENT.

ABSOLUTELY SUPERFLUOUS ALSO IS THE PROPOSAL TO CONSIDER VERIFICATION ISSUES ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS. THE GENERAL PROVISIONS ON VERIFICATION ISSUES, CONTAINED IN THE JOINT DOCUMENT, WILL APPLY TO ALL THE SYSTEMS BEING LIMITED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, INCLUDING NEW TYPES OF SYSTEMS.

IN CASES WHEN ANY AMBIGUOUS SITUATIONS ARISE, THEY CAN BE
CONSIDERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ALREADY AGREED PROVISIONS
OF ARTICLE XVIII.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE
SET FORTH TODAY MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO EXPAND EXISTING AREAS
OF AGREEMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE QUESTION OF SCC FUNCTIONS,
AND TO PROCEED TO AGREE ON THE NECESSARY PROVISIONS WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF ARTICLE XVIII, PAR. 2, BEARING IN MIND THE
STRICT CONFORMITY OF THESE FUNCTIONS TO THE TASKS FACED
BY THE SCC IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT.

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II

MR. AMBASSADOR,

IN THE INTERESTS OF FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD REACHING
AGREEMENT ON MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE PROVISIONS FOR INCLUSION
IN THE DOCUMENT BEING PREPARED, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS HELD, THE USSR DELEGATION IS UNDER INSTRU-

TIONS TO TABLE A PROPOSAL FOR THE SIDES TO UNDERTAKE NOT TO HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME SLBM LAUNCHERS OR HEAVY BOMBERS IN EXCESS OF A NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH A NORMAL CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE.

THIS NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE IS TABLED UNDER ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PRODUCTIVE PROGRESS IN THE WORK OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE CORRESPONDING PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT.

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WE BELIEVE IT ADVISABLE TO TAKE UP THIS QUESTION IN THE GROUP PREPARING THE JOINT TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

III

MR. AMBASSADOR,

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AS WELL AS THE EXISTENCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

THROUGHOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, FROM THEIR INITIAL STAGE UP TO THE PRESENT, THE SOVIET UNION HAS FIRMLY ADHERED TO THE VIEW THAT AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY, REQUIRES THAT IN RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS ALL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS BE CONSIDERED WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT ONE OF THE SIDES HAS NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WITH SUCH A CAPABILITY DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES. THESE ARE THE FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS OF THE U.S.

THE SPECIFIC DATA ABOUT THE SCALE OF DEPLOYMENT OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE BEING PUBLISHED AND WIDELY COMMENTED ON, IN THE U.S. PRESS AS WELL, DEMONSTRATE THAT THESE SYSTEMS HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE IMPACT UPON THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE ROLE OF FORWARD SUBMARINE BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES IS ALSO KNOWN.

IT IS NATURAL, THEREFORE, THAT THE SOVIET SIDE FIRMLY INSISTS ON RESOLVING THIS PROBLEM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE TASK OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS.

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IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE U.S. SIDE HAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AFFECT THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN THE SIDES.

THE QUESTION OF THESE SYSTEMS IS NEITHER ARTIFICIAL NOR CONTRIVED. IT ENSUES FROM THE ACTUAL STATE OF AFFAIRS WHICH, SINCE WE ARE TALKING ABOUT LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS, MUST BE CONSIDERED IN ALL ITS ASPECTS AND FROM ALL ANGLES. RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE WOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE LIMITATIONS BEING ESTABLISHED.

THERE CAN NO LONGER BE ANY DOUBT THAT A BUILDUP IN FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD UNDERMINE THE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIABILITY OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT STRATEGIC STABILITY. AND CONVERSELY, REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, WHICH DUE TO THEIR GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD BE WHOLLY CONSISTENT WITH THE INTERESTS OF ENSURING THE EFFECTIVENESS AND STABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, AND WOULD CONSTITUTE A MOST IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO COMPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE BY DETENTE IN THE MILITARY FIELD.

I WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE TO NOTE THE FACT THAT A REDUCTION IN FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS WOULD BE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE GOAL OF THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, AS AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, ON FURTHER LIMITATION AND POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS.

THE SOVIET SIDE ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION WHICH REQUIRES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH WORKING OUT THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

MR. AMBASSADOR,

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION IS THE EXISTENCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

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THIS QUESTION HAS ALSO BEEN AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, AND THE RELEVANT ARGUMENTS OF THE SOVIET SIDE ARE WELL KNOWN TO THE OTHER SIDE.

THIS ASPECT OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION HAS LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS INDISPUTABLE THAT THE EXISTENCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES HAS A DIRECT IMPACT UPON THE HIGHEST NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE USSR AND, IT SEEMS TO US, OF THE U.S. AS WELL, AT THE PRESENT TIME, AS WELL AS INCREASINGLY IN THE FUTURE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS FACTOR HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE U.S. SIDE AS WELL. ALREADY AT THE FIRST STAGE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS THE UNITED STATES TOOK NOTE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF "BASIC CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION (INCLUDING THIRD-COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS)."

THE SOVIET UNION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT CONSIDERA-
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TION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE AND BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND ACHIEVEMENT OF APPROPRIATE AGREED SOLUTIONS FOR THAT PROBLEM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS WOULD SERVE THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED, IN THIS CONNECTION WE DO NOT HAVE IN MIND ANY KIND OF MEASURES AIMED AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THIRD STATES. WE ARE SPEAKING OF CONSIDERATION OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO A FACTOR WHICH CANNOT BE IGNORED FROM THE STANDPOINT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE, THE USSR DELEGATION, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, ONCE AGAIN REAFFIRMS THE POSITION OF PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION WITH RESPECT TO QUESTIONS OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

THE USSR DELEGATION STATES AGAIN THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL IN THE FUTURE, TOO, INSIST ON RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE EXISTENCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES.

OFFICIAL TRANSLATION

WORDING FOR ARTICLE IV

"THE PARTIES UNDERTAKE NOT TO HAVE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT ANY TIME SLBM LAUNCHERS OR HEAVY BOMBERS IN EXCESS OF A NUMBER CONSISTENT WITH A NORMAL CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE."
JOHNSON

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